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Reforming the WTO Legal Order for Agricultural Trade: Issues for European 
Rural Policy in the Doha Round 
 
Michael Cardwell* and Christopher Rodgers** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Farm policy in the Community has undergone radical change over the past six years.  This 
change began with the Agenda 2000 reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy, agreed in 
Berlin on 24-25 March 1999, which saw a significant shift in financial support away from 
agricultural products and towards producers.  These reforms were greatly extended by the 
Mid-term Review, agreed in Luxembourg on 26 June 2003, which went far beyond any 
original remit.1. Farm subsidy payments were substantially ‘decoupled’ from production and 
switched decisively towards providing income support.  In particular, the majority of direct 
payments to farmers were reconfigured under the umbrella of the ‘single farm payment’ 
(‘SFP’), implemented in principle as from 1 January 2005.  The extent of the shift is 
emphasised by express legislative characterisation of the SFP as ‘income support’.2  
Consequently, of the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy enumerated in Article 33 
EC, that now accorded primacy is the ensuring of ‘a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community’.  It may also be suggested that ‘Mid-term Review’ is something of a misnomer, 
in that the measures that it introduced proved more wide-ranging than the measures 
introduced by Agenda 2000 itself.  The reform process remains ongoing.  While the Mid-term 
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1
  It was envisaged that the main effect of the Mid-term Review would be upon the milk quota system 
(on the basis that a decision would be taken to end milk quotas by 2006).  Yet, in the event, the milk 
quota system was one of the few areas of the Common Agricultural Policy that remained relatively 
undisturbed (milk quotas surviving until at least 31 March 2015): Council Regulation 1788/2003, OJ 
2003 L 270/123, Art.1. 
2
  Council Regulation 1782/2003, OJ 2003 L 270/1 (‘2003 Horizontal Regulation’), Art.1. 
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Review saw the recasting of direct payments to farmers under the First Pillar of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (market management), proposals have already been agreed for the further 
reform of the legislation governing the Second Pillar (rural development).3 
 Such radical change has been inextricably linked with negotiations in the World 
Trade Organization (‘WTO’). The relevant WTO disciplines which emerged from the 
Uruguay Round, and which are encapsulated in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (‘URAA’), have played a pivotal role in shaping the approach subsequently taken 
by the Community.  The relevant disciplines may be grouped under three heads: market 
access, domestic support and export subsidies.  For the purposes of the present article, the 
provisions on domestic support are of key importance.  These were predicated upon the 
adoption of the ‘Aggregate Measurement of Support’ (‘AMS’) as a basis both for calculating 
the level of subsidy received by farmers in contracting Members and for measuring the 
reduction commitments to be undertaken.  AMS was defined by Article 1(a) to mean ‘the 
annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in 
favour of the producers of the basic agricultural product or non–product-specific support 
provided in favour of agricultural producers in general’.  This was amplified by detailed rules 
in Annex 3, which provided for the calculation of AMS on a product-specific basis, using 
1986-1988 as the base period.  The URAA committed Members, in the case of developed 
countries, to a reduction of 20 per cent in the aggregate base AMS over six years.  So-called 
‘green box’ subsidies were exempt from the calculation of AMS and the reduction 
commitments;4 and there was a de minimis exclusion for product-specific domestic support 
which did not exceed 5 per cent of the value of production of that product in a given year or, 
for non-product-specific support, which did not exceed 5 per cent of the value of total 
                                                 
3
  European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on Support for Rural Development by the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), COM(2004)490.  On 20 June 2005 
political agreement was reached on the proposed regulation: IP/05/766, Tomorrow's Rural 
Development Policy: Broader, Simpler, Responding Better to Citizens' Concerns, Brussels, 21 June 
2005.  
4
  These are defined in Annex 2 to the URAA. 
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agricultural production in a given year.5  Exemption from reduction commitments was also 
conferred on direct payments made under certain production-limiting programmes, the so-
called ‘blue box’.6  It may be noted that the availability of ‘green box’ exemption has proved 
a particularly important factor, both in terms of domestic policy development within the 
Community and elsewhere, and in terms of its significance as a focal point for dispute in the 
Doha Round.  Those subsidies which did not fall within the ‘green box’ or ‘blue box’, and 
which were not de minimis, remained within the so-called ‘amber box’, subject to AMS 
reduction commitments.  The URAA also required Members, in the case of developed 
countries, to reduce export subsidies by 21 per cent by volume and 36 per cent by value from 
a 1986-1990 base. 
At the commencement of the Agenda 2000 reforms, one of the objectives of the 
European Commission was to ‘help prepare the Union for the next WTO Round’.7  Initially, 
however, internal pressures were considered in themselves sufficient to justify change.  For 
example, it was stated in The Future for European Agriculture, issued in March 1998, that 
‘[t]he challenges facing the CAP are first and foremost internal in nature’.8  Nonetheless, by 
the time of the Mid-term Review it is arguable that WTO considerations had come to reshape 
the very structure of the Common Agricultural Policy reform and the direct payments regime 
that it produced.  Above all, the provisions which implement the SFP would seem calculated 
to track the criteria for ‘green box’ support.  In consequence, when the Mid-Term Review was 
finally agreed, Commissioner Fischler felt able to assert that ‘[t]his will put us on the 
offensive in the WTO negotiations in Cancun’.9  Likewise, shortly after taking office, 
Commissioner Fischer Boel reiterated that ‘[t]he agricultural reform of 2003 made a decisive 
contribution to improving the position of the EU in matters concerning agricultural trade’; 
                                                 
5
  URAA, Art.6.4. 
6
  Ibid., Art.6.5. 
7
  European Commission, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, Bulletin of the European 
Union, Supplement 5/97, COM(97)2000, Part I, III.3. 
8
  European Commission, (1998), 1 (http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/ag2000/agprop/mot_en.htm, 
visited on 3 June 1998). 
9
  Speech/03/326, “The New, Reformed Agricultural Policy”, Luxembourg, 26 June 2003. 
 4
and, more graphically, she could conclude that ‘the days are long since past when European 
agriculture was the ugly duckling that some people still think it is’.10 
 This article will focus on three aspects of the developing relationship between 
European rural policy reform and the legal order for international trade in agricultural 
produce.  These are: first, the imperatives that have driven change to the Common 
Agricultural Policy and their linkage with the WTO negotiations; secondly, the key elements 
of the Agenda 2000 reforms and, most importantly, the Mid-term Review; and thirdly, the 
compatibility of the Common Agricultural Policy as now constituted with WTO 
commitments, including consideration of the decisions of the Panel and Appellate Body in 
United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton.11 
 
II. PRESSURES FOR REFORM AND THE WTO 
 
At the commencement of Agenda 2000, internal pressures were in themselves felt sufficient 
to justify change. Three factors, in particular, were highlighted. These were the need to 
improve competitiveness, the need to make the Common Agricultural Policy more acceptable 
to the citizen in the street and to the consumer, and the need to decentralise without giving 
rise to distortion of competition or renationalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy.12  
The Mid-term Review identified similar internal challenges, emphasising the need to secure 
‘a fair standard of living and income stability for the agricultural community’.  Such support 
would be justified ‘through the provision of services that the public expects farmers to 
provide’.13  In this may be detected a new ‘bargain’ between farmers and society.  The 
necessity for support was not questioned, but the nature of the support would be recast so as 
to meet the demands of the taxpayers who provided it.  In the words of Commissioner 
                                                 
10
  Speech/05/25, Agriculture and Rural Development in the EU25 - Looking Forward, Berlin, 20 
January 2005. 
11
  (2004) WT/DS267/R; and (2005) WT/DS267/AB/R. 
12
  See, e.g., European Commission, The Future for European Agriculture (1998) 
(http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/ag2000/agprop/mot_en.htm, visited on 3 June 1998). 
13
  European Commission, Mid-term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy, COM(2002)394, 2. 
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Fischler, ‘[o]ur proposal DOES NOT mean abandoning the CAP as some claim or fear.  We 
are firmly committed to support also agriculture in the future’.  Rather, ‘[w]hat it DOES mean 
is that we want to support our farmers differently’: the ‘political reality’ was that continued 
acceptance by the European taxpayer of the need for a Common Agricultural Policy depended 
on subsidies producing value for money for the taxpayer.14 
 That said, from the commencement of the reform process two external factors were 
clearly acknowledged: the prospect of Eastward enlargement; and the (then) forthcoming 
WTO negotiations.15  In the case of the WTO negotiations there were, besides, specific time 
constraints, because agriculture enjoyed its own ‘stand-alone’ schedule, not dependent upon 
the launch of a full ‘Round’. By virtue of Article 20 of the URAA, WTO Members committed 
themselves to initiate ‘negotiations for continuing the process’ one year before the end of the 
1995-2000 implementation period for the reforms agreed in the URAA.  Indeed, the 
imperative of ensuring the correct timing of Common Agricultural Policy reform emerges as a 
recurrent theme in Community discourse.  This may, in part at least, be attributed to the 
general perception that the Community had been ill prepared for the Uruguay Round, when 
the United States arguably stole a march with its initial proposal of the ‘zero-option’ (i.e. 
removing all trade distorting agricultural subsidies over a ten year period). Indeed, many 
commentators have considered the stance of the Community in the Uruguay Round to be 
primarily reactive in nature.16  By contrast, the Agenda 2000 reforms were understood from 
the outset to stake out the position that would be defended in what would become the Doha 
Round.  In 1999 Commissioner Fischler stated that ‘we need from the very beginning to adopt 
a clear and realistic position with which to enter the negotiations.  This we hope to achieve 
                                                 
14
  Speech/02/424, The Future of Farming and the European Agricultural Policy - Facing the 
Challenges, Seizing the Opportunities, Paris, 25 September 2002. 
15
  See, e.g., European Commission, The Future for European Agriculture (1998) 
(http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/ag2000/agprop/mot_en.htm, visited on 3 June 1998); and, 
generally, e.g., M Cardwell, ‘The European Model of Agriculture and World Trade: Reconfiguring 
Domestic Support’, in J Bell, A Dashwood, J Spencer and A Ward (eds), Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, Volume 5, 2002-2003 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 77-103; and A Greer, 
Agricultural Policy in Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 113-115. 
16
  See, e.g., KA Ingersent, AJ Rayner and RC Hine, ‘The EC Perspective’, in KA Ingersent, AJ Rayner 
and RC Hine (eds), Agriculture in the Uruguay Round (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), 55-87; and 
WD Coleman and S Tangermann, ‘The 1992 CAP Reform, the Uruguay Round and the Commission: 
Conceptualizing Linked Policy Games’, (1999) 37 Journal of Common Market Studies 385. 
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through Agenda 2000, so that we do not have to negotiate with our back against the wall 
again as we did in the Uruguay Round’.17  Accordingly, when agreement on the reform 
package was reached two months later at the Berlin Summit of 24-25 March 1999, the 
European Council expressly affirmed that ‘the decisions adopted...will constitute essential 
elements in defining the Commission’s negotiating mandate for the future multilateral trade 
negotiations at the WTO’.18  Similar sentiments were voiced again four years later, after 
agreement was reached on the Mid-term Review.  Emphasis was laid on the fact that the 
Community had radically reformed its subsidy regime, and other WTO Members were urged 
to follow suit.  In the words of Commissioner Fischler prior to the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference, ‘[t]hese actions clearly demonstrate a path of reform that is fully compatible with 
what all WTO parties committed to, the US and EU included: to move away from the trade 
distortions.  We have certainly moved; it’s time for others to do likewise’.19   
 While the pressure to meet WTO requirements would appear to have been consistent, 
its translation into specific legislative measures within the Community legal order would 
appear to have been more incremental.  This was expressly recognised at the time of the Mid-
term Review, where the Common Agricultural Policy was described as ‘an evolving policy’.20  
In consequence, as shall be seen, a significantly different impact on world trade has been 
claimed by the Community for, on the one hand, the reforms agreed at the Berlin Summit and, 
on the other, their subsequent Mid-term Review. 
 Before considering these reform packages in greater depth, two preliminary points 
should be noted.  First, although the specific legislative measures would appear to have been 
evolutionary, the Community institutions have throughout maintained that the overarching, 
and stable, objective has been to give ‘concrete form’ to a European Model of Agriculture.21  
The multifunctional model of European agriculture embraces both food and non-food outputs, 
                                                 
17
  Speech//99/14, The WTO and Agriculture in East and West, Berlin, 23 January 1999. 
18
  European Commission, Bulletin of the European Union, 3-1999, at I-Special Berlin European 
Council, 23. 
19
  Speech/03/373, CAP Reform: What Relevance for Cancun?, Washington, DC, 28 July 2003. 
20
  European Commission, Mid-term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy, COM(2002)394, 5. 
21
  Ibid.; and see, generally, e.g., M Cardwell, The European Model of Agriculture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), passim.  
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the latter including the protection of the environment, food safety, animal welfare and cultural 
heritage (these non-food outputs being often characterised as ‘public goods’, 'externalities’ or 
even ‘spillovers’).   The legitimacy of the multifunctional model has for some time been 
questioned.  Not least, it has been suggested that many of the public goods delivered by 
agricultural production could be achieved more efficiently if divorced from such production.22  
This debate has been continued in the Doha Round, where non-food outputs have been 
associated with ‘non-trade concerns’ and the focus of the debate has been on the extent to 
which it is legitimate to provide for their support.  In the words of the OECD, '[u]nderlying 
the debate on multifunctionality are some of the same considerations as the discussion of 
“non-trade” concerns that has evolved in the context of multilateral trade negotiations'.23  
These issues will be addressed more fully below. 
 The ongoing implementation of a multifunctional European Model of Agriculture 
was also re-affirmed at the time of the Mid-term Review.  Even as the Common Agricultural 
Policy was described as ‘an evolving policy’, it was stated that the objectives ‘essentially 
remain today the same as those established in Berlin and enhanced in the European Summit of 
Göteborg’.24  Further, it would seem that the Community sees world trade advantages in 
holding firm to the banner of the European Model of Agriculture.  It provides a single rallying 
point for defence of a disparate range of initiatives; and, in terms of the language of 
negotiation, on occasion has permitted some rhetoric.  For example, Commissioner Fischler 
could speak in 1999 of putting ‘the European model of agriculture to the WTO acid test’,25 
and in 2000 of a determination not ‘to sacrifice the European Model of Agriculture on the 
altar of [trade] liberalisation’.26     
                                                 
22
  See, e.g., ABARE, Multifunctionality: a Pretext for Protection? (1999) ABARE Current Issues 
No.3.  See also, for more equivocal treatments, e.g.: M Bohman, et al., The Use and Abuse of 
Multifunctionality (Washington, DC:Economic Research Service/USDA, 1999); and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical 
Framework (Paris: OECD, 2001), passim.  
23
  OECD, Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework (Paris: OECD, 2001), 10. 
24
  European Commission, Mid-term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy, COM(2002)394, 2. 
25
  Speech/99/117, The European Model of Agriculture - Facing the WTO Acid Test, Verona, 24 
September 1999. 
26
  IP/00/295, WTO Farm Negotiations: “EU Constructive but Firm”, Franz Fischler Says, Brussels, 
24 March 2000. 
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 Secondly, whether drawing up its legislation to implement the measures agreed at the 
Berlin Summit or the Mid-term Review, the Community has enjoyed a considerable 
advantage in comparison with the Uruguay Round.  The URAA already being in force, the 
Community has been able to draft the necessary legislation against the background of a pre-
existing legal framework for international agricultural trade, tailoring provisions to meet 
specific criteria in the WTO legal order that confer exemption from domestic support 
reduction commitments.  Nevertheless, the extent to which the reform process has delivered a 
fully defensible position in the Doha Round is open to question. 
 
III. THE KEY ELEMENTS OF COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The Agenda 2000 reforms and their Mid-term Review saw major advances in the transfer of 
support from product to producer.  This process arguably commenced with the 1992 
MacSharry reforms.27  Thus, when launching Agenda 2000, the Commission expressly 
proposed ‘deepening and extending the 1992 reform through further shifts from price support 
to direct payments’.28 The basic rationale was that earlier enunciated in the 1991 Reflections 
Paper, The Development and Future of the CAP: where support is proportionate to the 
quantity produced, there is a permanent incentive to greater production and further 
intensification.29 
 
                                                 
27
  On the 1992 MacSharry reforms, generally, see, e.g., N Neville and F Mordaunt, A Guide to the 
Reformed Common Agricultural Policy (London: Estates Gazette, 1993), passim; A Swinbank, ‘The 
New CAP’, in C Ritson and DR Harvey (eds.), The Common Agricultural Policy (2nd ed., 
Wallingford: CAB International, 1997), 95; and R Ackrill, The Common Agricultural Policy (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 92-107. 
28
  European Commission, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, Bulletin of the European 
Union, Supplement 5/97, COM(97)2000, Part One, III.4.  
29
  COM(91)100, 8. 
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B. The 1992 MacSharry Reforms 
 
The application of the shift in support from product to producer under the 1992 MacSharry 
reforms may be illustrated by the cereals sector.30  Support prices were reduced; and, in 
particular, the intervention price was cut from 117 Ecu per tonne in the 1993-1994 marketing 
year to 100 Ecu per tonne as from the 1995-1996 marketing year.31  However, in return, 
farmers received compensatory payments on an area basis.  These were, as a general rule, 
calculated by multiplying a basic amount per tonne by the average cereals yield determined 
for the region concerned.  To meet reductions in support prices, the basic amount rose from 
25 Ecu in the 1993-1994 marketing year to 45 Ecu per tonne as from the 1995-1996 
marketing year.32  Significantly, there continued to be very considerable differentiation 
between the levels of compensatory payments for cereals, oilseeds and proteins.  Thus, even 
within the cereals sector itself, specific regimes were retained for durum wheat and, should 
Member States so decide, maize.  It may also be noted that, whether the crops were cereals, 
oilseeds or proteins, production was curbed by a set-aside requirement (initially fixed at 15 
per cent); and, with like objective, in the livestock sector individual quotas were imposed on 
sheep annual premiums and suckler cow premiums.  The effect in world trade terms was 
apprehended to be compliance with the ‘blue box’ criteria, so securing exemption from 
domestic support reduction commitments.  As indicated, under Article 6(5)(a) of the URAA, 
direct payments under production-limiting programmes are exempt if: ‘(i) such payments are 
based on fixed area and yields; or (ii) such payments are made on 85 per cent or less of the 
base level of production; or (iii) livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head’.   
 There is ample evidence that the 1992 MacSharry reforms did succeed in curbing 
production.  For example, between 1991 and 1997 market support in respect of export refunds 
                                                 
30
  On the cereals sector, generally, see, e.g., JA Usher, EC Agricultural Law (2nd Ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 80-89. 
31
  Council Regulation 1766/92, OJ 1992 L 181/21, Art.3(3). 
32
  Council Regulation 1765/92, OJ 1992 L 181/12, Art.4. 
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fell from over 10 billion Ecu to 5.8 billion Ecu.33  The improvement in market balances and 
decrease in public stocks was a source of considerable satisfaction to the Commission at the 
commencement of the Agenda 2000 reforms.34  However, it had been bought at the cost of 
very heavy expenditure on direct payments to producers.  Thus, budgetary appropriations for 
arable area payments in 1998 were alone projected to reach 16,243 million Ecu, out of a total 
European Union budget of 82,019 million Ecu.35 
 
C. The Agenda 2000 Reforms: the Berlin Summit 
  
The Agenda 2000 reforms as agreed at the Berlin Summit without doubt took the 1992 
MacSharry reforms a step further.  That said, they were essentially incremental rather than 
constituting a sea-change in policy development.  Not least, the amended direct payments 
regime was intended to remain within the ‘blue box’, a fact reflected by the vigorous defence 
of the ‘blue box’ in Community submissions to the WTO.  For example, in European 
Communities Proposal: the Blue Box and Other Support Measures to Agriculture reference 
was made to OECD research which had found that area payments had proved relatively more 
income efficient and less trade-distorting than market price support (or payments based on 
output or payments based on variable input use); and that, accordingly, ‘considering the 
considerable reduction in trade impact brought about by this type of policy support and its 
success in meeting domestic concerns in the process of agricultural reform, the EC wishes to 
stress that the concept of the blue box, like that of the green box, must be maintained’.36  The 
subsequent EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal was likewise unequivocal, asserting that 
                                                 
33
  European Commission, The Agricultural Situation in the European Union: 1998 Report (Brussels: 
Luxembourg, European Commission, 1999), 148-149.  
34
 European Commission, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union, Bulletin of the European 
Union, Supplement 5/97, COM(97)2000, Part One, III.1. 
35
  European Commission, The Agricultural Situation in the European Union: 1998 Report (Brussels: 
Luxembourg, European Commission, 1999), 146 and 150. 
36
  WTO, G/AG/NG/W/17, 28 June 2000.  For the research referred to in the submission, see OECD, A 
Matrix Approach to Evaluating Policy: Preliminary Findings from PEM Pilot Studies of Crop Policy 
in the EU, the US, Canada and Mexico, COM/AGR/CA/TD/TC(99)117 (Paris: OECD, 2000). 
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‘[t]he EC are prepared to negotiate further reductions in support provided that, in particular, 
the concept of the “blue” and “green” boxes will continue’.37  
 The reforms agreed at the Berlin Summit nevertheless encompassed material 
amendments to the direct payments regime.38  Support prices were further driven down, with 
direct payments being correspondingly increased.  Thus, in the cereals sector, the intervention 
price was reduced by 15 per cent in two annual steps (from 119.19 Euros to 101.31 Euros per 
tonne), the first step being implemented in the 2000-2001 marketing year.39  In calculating the 
direct payment, the basic amount per tonne was raised from 54 Euros to 63 Euros per tonne 
over the same period, again in two annual steps.40  As a result, the template established under 
the 1992 MacSharry reforms was preserved; but increased market competitiveness in terms of 
price was again bought at the cost of higher direct payments.  Even by 2000, these accounted 
for 25,592.2 million Euros.41  Indeed, whereas 91 per cent of the agricultural budget had been 
spent on market support in 1991, it was envisaged that 68 per cent would be spent on direct 
payments by 2006.42  However, it may be remarked that the reduction in intervention price 
was neither as great nor as swift as had originally been proposed at the commencement of 
Agenda 2000.  Indeed, Commissioner Fischler openly accepted that the measures agreed at 
the Berlin Summit were a compromise.43  
 Importantly, there was also a substantial simplification of the direct payments regime, 
in line with the stated objectives of the Agenda 2000 reforms.44  Again taking arable crops as 
an example, the rates of payment in respect of cereals, linseed, oilseeds and land set aside 
                                                 
37
  WTO, G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000. 
38
  See, generally, e.g., D Galloway ‘Agenda 2000 - Packaging the Deal’ (1999) 37 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 9; R Ackrill, The Common Agricultural Policy, 115-127; and JA McMahon, ‘The 
Common Agricultural Policy: From Quantity to Quality’ (2002) 53 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
9. 
39
  Council Regulation 1766/92, OJ 1992 L 181/21, Art.3(1), as amended by Council Regulation 
1253/1999, OJ 1999 L 160/18. 
40
  Council Regulation 1251/1999, OJ 1999 L 180/1, Art.4(3). 
41
  European Commission, The Agricultural Situation in the European Union: 1998 Report (Brussels: 
Luxembourg, European Commission, 2002), 130. 
42
  Commissioner Fischler, Speech/01/477, Agricultural Policy for the Future: Changing Concerns, 
Changing Objectives, Salzburg, 19 October 2001. 
43
  Speech/99/101, The Agenda 2000 Agreement: “Der Himmel in Berlin” or “Sleepless in Seattle”?, 
Brussels, 29 June 1999. 
44
  European Commission, The Future for European Agriculture (1998) 
(http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/ag2000/agprop/mot_en.htm, visited on 3 June 1998). 
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were all to converge to 63 Euros per tonne by the 2002-2003 marketing year.  Proteins would 
remain an exception, receiving 72.5 Euros per tonne as from the 2000-2001 marketing year.45 
 
D. The Agenda 2000 Reforms: Mid-term Review 
 
By contrast, the Mid-term Review constituted a substantial reconfiguration of the direct 
payments regime.46  As seen, most domestic support schemes were rolled into the SFP; and in 
the overall structure of the new regime may be detected the influence of WTO considerations.  
More specifically, there was clear intent to secure ‘green box’ exemption from domestic 
support reduction commitments by meeting the criteria for decoupled income support set out 
in Paragraph 6 of Annex 2 to the URAA.  Central to this claim has been the assertion that the 
SFP is production neutral, in that a farmer does not receive payment differentiated according 
to the crop or other agricultural product produced. Moreover, it is claimed that the 
‘decoupled’ support permits more effective response to market signals.  That said, before 
considering the more detailed aspects of the Mid-term Review, it must be recognised that on a 
theoretical level the precise meaning of ‘decoupling’ remains elusive, notwithstanding its 
importance to the URAA.  In the words of the OECD, ‘[e]ven if the general meaning of the 
term “decoupling” seems clear and already well accepted, there are several difficulties in 
arriving at an operational definition’.47  Not least, a distinction has been drawn between ‘fully 
decoupled’ support and ‘effectively fully decoupled’ support.  The latter requires that 
‘production (or trade) not differ from the level that would have occurred in the absence of the 
measure’, whereas the former requires also that ‘the quantity adjustment due to any outside 
shock should not be in any way altered either’.48  In the view of the OECD, the definition of 
                                                 
45
  Council Regulation 1251/1999, OJ 1999 L 180/1, Art.4(3). 
46
  See, generally, e.g., J Moody and W Neville, Mid Term Review: a Practical Guide (Bristol: Burges 
Salmon, 2004), 32-165. 
47
 OECD, Decoupling: a Conceptual Overview (Paris: OECD, 2001), 8.  See also, e.g., MR Grossman, 
‘Multifunctionality and Non-trade Concerns’, in M Cardwell, MR Grossman and CP Rodgers (eds.), 
Agriculture and International Trade: Law, Policy and the WTO (Wallingford: CAB International, 
2003), 85. 
48
  OECD, Decoupling: a Conceptual Overview (Paris: OECD, 2001), 5. 
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decoupling implicit in the URAA is in line with the definition of an effectively decoupled 
package: in other words, a package whose introduction does not increase the level of 
production.  Accordingly, while farmers may decide to alter their cropping patterns, this 
would occur ‘in a way that does not result in larger production’ (although the response of 
supply to an external shock could be different).49      
 Six aspects of the SFP will be highlighted here, all of which have significant WTO 
implications.  First, although broad in scope, the SFP is not exhaustive.  It has extended ab 
initio to all products included in the arable crops regime, grain legumes, seeds, beef and 
sheep.50  Moreover, Member States may opt to implement the SFP on a regional as opposed to 
an individual basis;51 and in these circumstances it may also include ab initio the dairy 
premium and additional payments.52  Further, following reform of the sugar sector, as from 1 
January 2006 compensation payments for price cuts in that sector form a yet further element 
of the SFP.53  It is significant, however, that over and above the SFP there remain targeted aid 
schemes, such as the specific quality premium for durum wheat and the protein crop 
premium.54  There would seem to be no question that these targeted aid schemes are coupled 
to a particular form of production. 
                                                 
49
  Ibid., 9.  Express reliance was placed on definitions of decoupling developed in SA Cahill, 
‘Calculating the Rate of Decoupling for Crops under CAP/Oilseeds Reform’ (1997) 48 Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 349. 
50
  For the support schemes comprised within the SFP, see the 2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 
270/1, Annex I. 
51
  Under the general rule, farmers receive the SFP on an individual basis by reference to their historic 
entitlement over a 2000-2002 reference period: ibid., Arts.37-38.  However, by way of derogation, 
Member States may allocate flat-rate entitlements per hectare to farmers within a region: ibid., Arts.58-
63.   In the case of England, the decision has been to phase in payments on a regional basis over the 
period 2005-2012: Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes Regulations 
2005, S.I.2005 No.219, Sch.1 (the regional element rising from 10 per cent in 2005 to 100 per cent in 
2012 and the historic element falling correspondingly). 
52
  2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 270/1, Art.62.  The dairy premium and additional payments 
were introduced as from 2004 to compensate dairy farmers for the reduction of market support in the 
milk sector: ibid., Arts.95-97.  Their incorporation into the SFP arguably prejudices dairy farmers, in 
that compensation directed to one sector of the agricultural industry (the milk sector) becomes spread 
among all farmers entitled to the SFP.  That said, any potential claim that this breaches the Community 
legal order would seem ill-founded given the express authorisation of the incorporation of dairy 
premiums into the SFP by Council Regulation 1189/2005, OJ 2005 L 24/15.      
53
  See, e.g., IP/05/776, Sugar Reform will Offer EU Producers Long-term Competitive Future, 
Brussels, 22 June 2005.  For the implementing legislation, see the 2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ L 
270/1, as amended by Council Regulation 319/2006, OJ L 58/32 
54
  2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 270/1, Arts.72-78. 
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   Secondly, while as a general rule the SFP is applicable as from 1 January 2005, 
Member States enjoy the ability to delay implementation until either 1 January 2006 or 1 
January 2007.55  In consequence, substantial coupled support may be retained for up to two 
years and Greece, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain have taken advantage of this 
derogation.56 
 Thirdly, once the SFP is fully implemented, Member States will still enjoy the ability 
to provide for partial as opposed to full decoupling.  For example, in the arable sector it is 
possible to retain up to 25 per cent of arable crop area payments linked to production or, 
alternatively, up to 40 per cent of durum wheat supplement payments.  In the case of sheep 
and goat payments, up to 50 per cent may remain coupled.57  The extent to which this 
derogation has been exercised has been variable.  For example, in England there has been no 
partial decoupling in 2005, while in Scotland up to 29.8 million Euros could be linked to beef 
calf production and in Italy up to 142,491,000 Euros could be linked to arable crop 
production.58 
 As a result of these targeted aid schemes and derogations, the Community has openly 
accepted that, at least initially, there remains a proportion of domestic support that does not 
fall within the ‘green box’.  This is reflected in the continuing defence of the ‘blue box’ even 
after the Mid-term Review had been agreed.59  However, the Community has also contended 
that by 2005 some 90 per cent of the direct payments covered by the Mid-term Review have 
already been decoupled from production.60  And this has proved the basis of the proposal in 
the Doha Round negotiations to cut trade-distorting subsidies by 70 per cent.61 
                                                 
55
  Ibid., Art.71. 
56
  See, e.g., Agra Europe Weekly, No.2142, 4 February 2005, EP/9-10. 
57
  2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 270/1, Arts.66-67. 
58
  Ibid., Annex VIII, as amended by Commission Regulation 118/2005, OJ 2005 L 24/15.  For the 
Scottish Beef Calf Scheme, see the Common Agricultural Policy Single Farm Payment and Support 
Schemes (Scotland) Regulations 2005, S.I.2005 No.143, Regs.16-25. 
59
  See, e.g., European Commission, EU Agriculture and the WTO: Doha Development Agenda, 
Cancun - September 2003: INFO (Brussels: European Commission, 2003), 5.  
60
  Commissioner Fischer Boel, Speech/05/773, WTO – Hong Kong Ministerial: Time to Get Serious, 
Brussels, 8 December 2005. 
61
  See, e.g., MEMO/05/400, Doha Round: EU Offer in Agricultural Negotiations, Brussels, 28 October 
2005; and see also Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, WTO, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005, 
Annex A, para 8. 
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 Fourthly, close attention must be paid to the SFP provisions governing land use, in 
the light of the Panel and Appellate Body decisions in United States - Subsidies on Upland 
Cotton.62  As a general rule, SFP payment entitlements can only be unlocked by ‘matching’ 
them against eligible land owned or occupied by the producer.  In other words, a producer 
must be able to show that he owns or occupies a hectare of eligible land for each SFP 
payment entitlement in respect of which a claim is made.63  However, it is expressly provided 
that land under, inter alia, fruit, vegetables and potatoes may not sustain a claim for the SFP 
(except, in the case of potatoes, where intended for the manufacture of potato starch).64  The 
rationale behind the measure was that fruit, vegetables and potatoes had in the past been 
largely unsupported; and, in the absence of such an exclusion, there was a danger that farmers 
entitled to the SFP would move into these sectors bolstered by the competitive advantage that 
it conferred.  The net result, nonetheless, is that the SFP may on this account fall short of full 
production neutrality, channelling support into those agricultural sectors that have previously 
enjoyed support.  On the other hand, where a Member State opts to allocate the SFP on a 
regional basis, land under, inter alia, fruit, vegetables and potatoes may unlock payment 
entitlements.65 
Fifthly, the Mid-term Review saw the retention of set aside as a supply-side 
management tool in the arable sector, notwithstanding some nervousness as to the extent to 
which land retirement measures of this kind are ‘green box’ compatible.  The set-side model 
used in previous Community legislation had been ‘rotational’, whereby the land set aside 
from production by each producer was changed annually; and, under the reforms agreed at the 
Berlin Summit, a compulsory set-aside rate was fixed at 10 per cent from the 2000-2001 
                                                 
62
  (2004) WT/DS267/R; and (2005) WT/DS267/AB/R. This is considered further below. 
63
  2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 270/1, Art.44(1): ‘[a]ny payment entitlement accompanied 
by an eligible hectare shall give rise to the payment of the amount fixed by the payment entitlement’. 
64
  Ibid., Art.51, as amended by Council Regulation 864/2004, OL2004 L 161/48.  More precisely, in 
the case of fruit and vegetables, farmers may not unlock payment entitlements with (i) land used for the 
production of products referred to in Art.1(2) of Council Regulation 2200/96, OJ 1996 L 297/1 (on the 
common organisation of the market in fruits and vegetables); or (ii) land used for the production of 
products referred to in Art.1(2) of Council Regulation 2201/96, OJ 1996 L 297/29 (on the common 
organisation of the market in processed fruit and vegetable products).  For allocation on a regional 
basis, see n.51. 
65
  2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 270/1, Art.60, as amended by Council Regulation 864/2004, 
OJ 2004 L 161/48. 
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marketing year through to 2006-2007 marketing year:66  On issue of the Mid-term Review of 
the Common Agricultural Policy it was proposed that the set-aside concept be extended and, 
further, that compulsory long-term set-aside be introduced on arable land for 10 years.67  In 
the event, however, the rotational model has been retained, in a complex settlement under 
which set-aside entitlements are allocated and managed as a separate branch of the SFP 
scheme.  Each producer has been allocated set-aside entitlements calculated in principle by 
reference to the average number of acres compulsorily set aside over 2000-2002.  However, 
the United Kingdom has opted to apply a regionalised method for calculating the set-aside 
rate, as allowed for in the Community legislation.68  In consequence, it has been fixed at 8 per 
cent for lowland England, 1.3 per cent for severely disadvantaged areas and 0 per cent for 
moorland.69  Land which is set aside cannot as a rule be used for agricultural purposes or for 
the production of a commercial crop, but must be maintained in good agricultural and 
environmental condition.70  Payment of set-aside entitlements is unlocked where a producer 
can match set-aside entitlements against eligible land, as under the SFP scheme generally. 
 Sixthly, the multifunctional role of agriculture has been recognised by the imposition 
of cross-compliance conditions upon receipt of both the SFP and other direct payments.  
Farmers are obliged to observe a range of Community statutory management requirements in 
the areas of: public, animal and plant health; the environment; and animal welfare.71  They 
must also maintain all agricultural land in 'good agricultural and environmental condition', 
minimum requirements for which are to be defined at national or regional level by the 
                                                 
66
  Council Regulation 1251/1999, Art.6, OJ 1999 L 160/1.  
67
  European Commission, COM(2002)394, 21. 
68
  2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 270/1, Art.63(2).  
69
  The calculations are labyrinthine. The set-aside rate is less than the original 10 per cent applied from 
2000 because the new scheme covers a larger area of each holding: instead of just applying to arable 
land the set aside scheme now applies to land used for all purposes other than permanent pasture (it 
could include, for instance fodder crops and temporary grass). The percentage of the total eligible area 
of a holding to which the set-aside rate applies is, therefore, greater. The intention is to arrive at a 
similar area of arable land set aside in any one year, defined on a regional basis, by scaling down the 
total set-aside requirement proportionately. 
70
  2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 270/1, Art.56(1). 
71
  Ibid., Art.4 and Annex III.  These statutory management requirements are to be introduced in three 
tranches over the period 1 January 2005 to 1 January 2007. 
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Member States on the basis of a Community framework.72  This aspect of the reform 
measures would appear to be targeted towards improving the public acceptability of the 
Common Agricultural Policy.  Moreover, Commissioner Fischler could state that, ‘[b]y 
making direct payments subject to cross-compliance, the end product is fully traceable from 
stable to table’.73  That said, the statutory management requirements set out in Annex III to 
the 2003 Horizontal Regulation are requirements that farmers should in principle already be 
observing under Community law. This point was recently highlighted, for example, by the 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds in evidence to the House of Common Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Committee.  Their view was that the cross-compliance conditions 
should be regarded as unnecessary ‘green-tinging’ of direct payments.74  For the same reason, 
a sharp distinction can be drawn between the SFP and payments for agri-environmental and 
animal welfare commitments under Council Regulation 1257/1999 (‘Rural Development 
Regulation’).  The latter must specifically ‘involve more than the application of usual good 
farming practice including good animal husbandry practice’;75 and it is noteworthy that 
payments under environmental programmes have long been notified to the WTO under 
Annex 2 to the URAA.76 
 It is therefore questionable whether the cross-compliance conditions attached to the 
SFP and other direct payments deliver additional benefits in return for public expenditure.77  
On the other hand, it would seem incontrovertible that cross-compliance does offer new 
                                                 
72
  Ibid., Art.5 and Annex IV.  For the implementing legislation in England, see the Common 
Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes Appeals)(England) Regulations 2004, 
S.I.2004 No.2689; the Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes (Cross 
Compliance)(England) Regulations 2004, S.I.2004 No.3196; the Common Agricultural Policy Single 
Payment and Support Schemes (Set Aside)(England) Regulations 2004, S.I.2004 No.3385; the 
Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes (Integrated Administration and 
Control System) Regulations 2005, S.I.2005 No.218; and the Common Agricultural Policy Single 
Payment and Support Schemes Regulations 2005, S.I.2005 No.219. 
73
  Speech/04/08, Trade, Reform and the Future of Europe, Krems, Austria, 9 January 2004. 
74
  House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, The Mid-term Review of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, Third Report of Session 2002-03, HC 151, para 76.  See also Moody and 
W Neville, Mid Term Review: a Practical Guide (Bristol: Burges Salmon, 2004), 32. 
75
  OJ 1999 L 160/80, Art.23(2), as amended by Council Regulation 1783/2003, OJ 2003 L 270/70 
(which introduced payments for animal welfare commitments).   
76
  See, e.g., WTO, G/AG/NG/S/2, Green Box Measures: Background Paper by the Secretariat, 19 
April 2000, Annex 2, Table S. 
77
  See, e.g., House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, The Mid-term 
Review of the Common Agricultural Policy, Third Report of Session 2002-03, HC 151, para 52. 
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means of enforcing pre-existing multifunctional obligations in the Community legal order.  In 
particular, in the case of the statutory management requirements set out in Annex III, the 2003 
Horizontal Regulation provides for reduction or exclusion from payments in the event of non-
compliance and, in so doing, provides a sanction over and above any sanctions in the various 
Directives and Regulations which form the basis of those cross-compliance requirements.78  
Where non-compliance is intentional, the percentage of reduction is not in principle to be less 
than 20 per cent; and, as the most draconian sanction, it is possible to exclude a farmer from 
one or several aid schemes for one or more years.  Moreover, the 2003 Horizontal Regulation 
imposes the same sanctions for breach of its requirement to maintain all agricultural land in 
good agricultural and environmental condition.   
 Finally, it may be emphasised that, apart from cross-compliance, non-trade concerns 
were expressly addressed at the time of the Mid-term Review by amendment to the Rural 
Development Regulation.  As indicated, payments are now available for animal welfare as 
well as agri-environment commitments, provided that those commitments extend beyond 
usual good farming practice, including good animal husbandry practice.  Further, new 
chapters have been added on ‘meeting standards’ and on food quality.79  The former provides 
support to help farmers to adapt to demanding standards based on Community legislation in 
the fields of:: the environment; public, animal and plant health; animal welfare; and 
occupational safety.  The latter comprises support for both production methods designed to 
improve the quality of agricultural products and the promotion of those products, with a view 
to, inter alia, achieving added value.  
 
IV. COMPATIBILITY WITH WTO COMMITMENTS 
 
A. General 
 
                                                 
78
  OJ 2003 L 270/1, Arts.6-7. 
79
  OJ 1999 L 160/80, Arts.21a-d and 24a-d, as amended by Council Regulation 1783/2003, OJ 2003 L 
270/70. 
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In line with the development of Community policy, the defence of domestic support in the 
context of the WTO has evolved from emphasis on non-trade concerns, under the broader 
umbrella of the multifunctional European Model of Agriculture, to a newer emphasis on 
decoupled income support.  At the inception of the Doha Round the importance attached by 
the Community to non-trade concerns was seen as a defining feature.  Commissioner Fischler 
stated in 1999, for example, that ‘the negotiations would have to go beyond purely market-
related issues and cover areas of social concern such as environmental protection, animal 
welfare, quality and food safety.  We must realise that suspicion of the WTO is already 
running high.  If people’s impression that the WTO puts trade before health issues is 
confirmed, it will not become stronger in future, but weaker’.80 
The Community was not alone in advocating the incorporation of non-trade concerns 
into the URAA, as evidenced by the formation of a loose grouping under the title ‘The 
Friends of Multifunctionality’ (of which the Community was a leading member).  The profile 
of this grouping was heightened by, for example, a Conference on Non-trade Concerns at 
Ullenswang, Norway, in July 2000.81  Nonetheless, reaching a consensus on the identity of the 
non-trade concerns to be promoted in the framework of the agriculture negotiations continues 
to prove difficult, as does agreeing the relative priority to be accorded to each of them.  
Within the ‘Friends of Multifunctionality’ itself, different weight is accorded to different non-
trade concerns.  In the case of several major food importers, such as Japan, food security is 
seen as a key issue.82  Yet, for others, such as Norway, rural employment, agricultural 
landscapes and biodiversity have been granted higher status.83  The position is exacerbated by 
the fact that, although Article 20 of the URAA expressly provided that non-trade concerns 
should be taken into account in the re-negotiations, it gave no indication of the nature of the 
concerns which this might encapsulate, other than in the Preamble specifically to mention 
food security and the need to protect the environment. 
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  Speech/99/71, WTO Press Conference Speaking Note, Speech/99/177, Brussels, 23 November 1999. 
81
  WTO, Note on Non-trade Concerns, G/AG/NG/W/36, 22 September 2000. 
82
  WTO, Negotiating Proposal by Japan, G/AG/NG/W/91, 21 December 2000. 
83
  WTO, WTO Agriculture Negotiations: Proposal by Norway, G/AG/NG/W/101, 16 January 2001 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the initial negotiating position of the Community depended 
heavily on acceptance of the multifunctional nature of the European Model of Agriculture, 
and with it the importance of accommodating non-trade concerns such as animal welfare, the 
protection of the environment and food safety.  For example, the EC Comprehensive 
Negotiating Proposal identified four categories of measure targeted at ‘important societal 
goals’ and for which ‘green box’ exemption should be applied: measures for the protection of 
the environment; measures targeted at the sustained vitality of rural areas and poverty 
alleviation; food security for developing countries; and animal welfare measures.84  Many 
other WTO Members have also addressed non-trade concerns in their negotiating proposals, 
more especially in the Second Phase, which commenced in March 2001.  Ten issues were 
recommended for consideration in this Phase, of which three could be described as non-trade 
concerns, viz. food security, food safety and rural development.85  Subsequent submissions 
confirmed this trend.86  However, they did not squarely address the fundamental problem of 
defining the parameters of the concept.  As a consequence, although the 2001 Doha 
Declaration included an unequivocal statement that ‘[w]e take note of the non-trade concerns 
reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted by Members and confirm that non-trade 
concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided for in the Agreement on 
Agriculture’, no attempt was made to give this substance.87  The Community heralded the 
inclusion of this statement in the Doha Declaration as recognition of its own negotiating 
stance.88  Yet, in reality, it could be argued that it merely reiterated the requirements already 
stipulated by the URAA.  Similarly, the Framework for Establishing Modalities in 
Agriculture agreed in Geneva in the summer of 2004 ('2004 Framework Document'), and on 
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  WTO, EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, G/AG/NG/W/90, 14 December 2000, para 13.  See 
also, e.g., R Aggarwal, ‘Dynamics of Agriculture Negotiations in the World Trade Organization’, 
(2005) 39 Journal of World Trade 741.   
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  WTO,  Agriculture: Negotiations 2000 March 2001: Work Programme for the Second Phase,  
27  March 2001 (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agneg7_e.htm,  
visited on 2 April 2001). 
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  A good illustration is provided by the submission by the Community on food safety issues: WTO, 
Food Safety: Note by the European Communities, D(2001)(DIVERS/500186 ur), 20 July 2001. 
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  WTO, Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1/, 14 November 2001, para 13. 
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  IP/01/1584, “New WTO Round Slap in the Face for Isolationism”, Says EU Farm Commissioner 
Fischler, Doha, 14 November 2001.  
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which the ongoing negotiations are now based, contains a statement of principle that ‘[n]on- 
trade concerns, as referred to in Paragraph 13 of the Doha Declaration, will be taken into 
account’, but again takes us no further forward in identifying the nature or scope of the 
concerns to be included.89 
As indicated, certain key WTO Members have displayed a considerable measure of 
scepticism towards the very concept of multifunctionality.  Significantly, however, the United 
States has adopted a relatively neutral approach, as in the 2001 policy document, Food and 
Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the New Century.90  More specifically in the context of 
the WTO, the United States has affirmed that it is ‘committed to and supports policies that 
address non-trade concerns, including food security, resource conservation, rural 
development, and environmental protection’.91  Its negotiating position has also been 
characterised, nevertheless, by a determination that meeting these objectives must not be 
allowed to create new economic distortions.  In particular, a consequence to be avoided is the 
passing of the cost of state funding for such activities onto other countries by closing markets, 
or introducing unfair competition, or both.  It could be argued on the one hand, therefore, that 
the need to address non-trade concerns without ‘spillover’ and trade distortion has become a 
recurrent feature of United States policy in agriculture (if not elsewhere).92  On the other 
hand, it must also be noted that, even by the time that the U.S. Proposal for Global 
Agricultural Trade Reform was submitted to the WTO in 2002, there was distinctly less 
emphasis on both non-trade concerns and multifunctionality more generally.93 
 While non-trade concerns constituted a defining feature of the negotiating position 
adopted by the Community at the commencement of the Doha Round, the Mid-term Review 
triggered a switch in focus to the SFP and, in particular, to claims that it met the ‘green box’ 
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  WTO, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, 
WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, Annex A, para 2. 
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  United States Department of Agriculture (‘USDA’), (Washington, DC: USDA, 2001). 
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  WTO  Proposal for Comprehensive Long-term Agricultural Trade Reform: Submission from the 
United States, G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000. 
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  See, e.g., Bohman, M. et al., The Use and Abuse of Multifunctionality (Washington, DC: Economic 
Research Service/USDA, 1999). 
93
  USDA, U.S. Proposal for Global Agricultural Trade Reform 
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criteria for decoupled income support.  This change of approach was evident from the 
inception of the Mid Term Review in 2002.94  Further, the position adopted at Cancun in 2003 
was predicated on the transfer, by reason of the SFP, of most domestic support from the ‘blue 
box’ to the ‘green box’.  Indeed, the Commission estimated in 2003 that ‘blue box’ payments 
of over 30 billion Euros per year would fall to under 10 billion Euros per year, with ‘green 
box’ payments correspondingly increasing to reach over 20 billion Euros per year.95  More 
recently, the decoupling of support payments from production was described by 
Commissioner Fischer Boel as ‘perhaps the cornerstone of our reforms’.96 
 Two principal questions need to be addressed. To what extent does the SFP meet the 
‘green box’ criteria in the WTO legal order for decoupled income support? And to what 
extent can non-trade concerns be accommodated under the URAA or, indeed, under a re-
negotiated agreement?  This second question may be examined with regard to both the 
multifunctional cross-compliance conditions attached to the SFP and other direct payments 
and with regard to the more targeted farm support provided under the Rural Development 
Regulation.  A related and further question is the vexed issue of quantification, which 
underlies many of the difficulties confronting both the URAA as currently implemented and 
any attempt to negotiate a new agreement. 
 
B. The Single Farm Payment as Decoupled Income Support 
 
The rules governing ‘green box’ exemption from domestic support reduction commitments 
are currently contained in Annex 2 to the URAA.  To qualify for exemption, domestic support 
must satisfy two criteria.  First, it must satisfy the ‘fundamental requirement’, set out in 
Paragraph 1 of Annex 2, that a support scheme ‘must have no, or at most minimal, trade-
                                                 
94
  See Mid-term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy COM(394)2002, 20, where a key 
objective of the introduction of reforms was expressly stated to be ‘to conserve the WTO-Green Box 
compatibility of the payments’.  
95
  European Commission, EU Agriculture and the WTO: Doha Development Agenda, Cancun -
September 2003: INFO (Brussels: European Commission, 2003). 
96
  Speech/05/280, Agricultural Reform in a Global Context, Oslo, 13 May 2005. 
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distorting effects or effects on production’.  Paragraph 1 further provides that the support 
must be provided through a publicly funded government programme not involving transfers 
from consumers; and that the support must not have the effect of providing price support to 
producers.  Additionally, it must satisfy one of a number of policy-specific conditions set out 
in the remaining Paragraphs of Annex 2.  Before examining these, it should be noted that the 
fundamental requirement in paragraph 1 itself raises a number of problems.  It is unclear 
whether the criterion that a measure be at most minimally trade-distorting is a free-standing 
obligation or not.  This question was expressly left open by both the Panel and the Appellate 
Body in United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton.97  Another problem raised by the 
fundamental requirement is the issue of quantification: what is meant by 'minimal' trade 
distortion?  The URAA gives no indication of the basis for quantifying the effects of support 
for the purposes of ascertaining whether its trade-distorting effects are more than 'minimal'.  
Similarly, the URAA supplies no guidance for determining whether the effect of support is in 
fact to provide price support to producers.  This question will be revisited below, as it is 
common to several of the key 'green box' criteria, as currently framed. 
Of the specific conditions to be met in addition to the fundamental requirement set 
out in Paragraph 1, those governing schemes that provide direct payments to producers are of 
central importance to the ‘green box’ compatibility of the SFP.  The detailed rules are 
contained in Paragraphs 5–13 of Annex 2 to the URAA. Paragraph 6 governs decoupled 
income support and is of greatest relevance in this context. It provides as follows: 
‘(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly-defined criteria such 
as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a 
defined and fixed base period. 
(b) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based 
on, the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the 
producer in any year after the base period. 
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  (2004) WT/DS267/R, para 7.412; and (2005) WT/DS267/AB/R, para 334. 
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(c)  The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based 
on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in 
any year after the base period. 
(d) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based 
on, the factors of production employed in any year after the base period. 
(e) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments.’ 
These detailed rules raise a number of issues.98  First may be considered the 
provisions governing base periods.  Their underlying rationale is that, because exempt direct 
payments must be founded on a historical base period, farmers cannot influence the size of 
the direct payments that they receive through changes in their current behaviour.  It follows, 
in theory at least, that their current production decisions will be determined solely by free 
market considerations.  In United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton one of the key issues 
was the extent to which it was permissible to update base areas.  Under the United States 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 farmers were permitted for the purposes of 
the direct payments regime to update base areas from those established earlier for the 
production flexibility contracts regime formerly applicable under the Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996.  Brazil argued before the Panel that, where one 
decoupled income support regime was replaced by another with the same structure, design 
and eligibility criteria, then they should have the same base period.  The Community also 
argued that continued updating of reference periods in respect of the existing decoupled 
support created an expectation that production of certain crops would reap payment benefits.99  
The Panel did not consider it necessary to decide the issue; but it did observe that the direct 
payments regime was a ‘successor’ programme to the production flexibility contracts regime, 
albeit with differences.  Also, it felt there was no evidence, ‘only speculation’, as to whether 
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producers would in the future be able to further update their base areas.100  The Appellate 
Body similarly eschewed detailed consideration of this issue.101   
In the context of the SFP, this raises the question whether it is a ‘successor’ 
programme to earlier support regimes.  The general rule is that the SFP is based upon support 
payments claimed by producers during the 2000-2002 reference period, and this clearly 
involves considerable updating from, for example, the 1989-1991 base period which had 
earlier applied for arable area payments made to cereals producers.102  Although the clear 
intention with the SFP was to exclude the linkage of payments to the type or volume of 
production in any year after the base period chosen, payments can be based on the type or 
volume of production in the base period itself.  A link with production therefore remains.  
Perhaps more importantly, until clear guidance is given by the Panel or Appellate Body on the 
legitimacy of updating the base areas used in support schemes, WTO Members cannot be sure 
whether or not it is legitimate to update base areas to take account of more recent production 
patterns. 
 Secondly, considerable obscurity is evident in the fundamental ‘green box’ stipulation 
for decoupled income support that ‘[n]o production shall be required in order to receive such 
payments’.103  This part of the definition is central to a key policy objective of the URAA 
‘green box’ criteria, namely to breaking the link between support payments and production.  
As a matter of textual analysis, however, the clause is open to conflicting legal interpretations.  
Does it mean that a support scheme must prohibit continued production if a producer is to be 
eligible for payments?  Or is it sufficient merely for the support scheme to remove the 
requirement for continued production as a mandatory pre-requisite for payments?  This issue 
was another that was considered in United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton.  The Panel 
held that the criterion ‘does not concern a negative requirement.  It only prohibits a positive 
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requirement, i.e. a requirement of production’.104  Further, the Panel accepted the argument 
advanced by the United States that Paragraph 6(b) should permit decoupled income support 
that requires the recipient to engage in the production of no crops at all, since the provision 
only prohibits the amount of payments being related to, or based on, the type or volume of 
production in any year after the base period.  Accordingly, in the view of the Panel, the 
prohibition would not cover those required to undertake no production at all.105 
On this point, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel.  It decided that, by 
prohibiting Members from making ‘green box’ measures contingent on continued production, 
the URAA implied that Members were ‘allowed, in principle, to require no production at all’.  
The Appellate Body also addressed Paragraph 6(b) and the argument that making payments 
contingent on a total ban on production could be seen as a way of relating the amount of 
payment to the volume of production (the volume of production in this case being nil).   This 
argument was felt to be inconsistent with the combined meaning and effect of Paragraphs 6(b) 
and (e), so favouring an interpretation of Paragraph 6(b) that permitted a total ban of 
production.106  
With specific reference to the SFP scheme, however, a different problem may be 
encountered in that, although there is no requirement to continue production in order to 
receive support payments, the cross-compliance conditions may themselves indirectly require 
a minimum level of production.  In particular, farmers are obliged to maintain all agricultural 
land in good agricultural and environmental condition;107 and, according to the Community 
standards set out in the 2003 Horizontal Regulation, this may involve, for example, the 
maintenance of ‘minimum livestock stocking rates and/or appropriate regimes’.108  There 
must be an argument that this language requires some level of production in contravention of 
Paragraph 6(e). 
                                                 
104
  (2004) WT/DS267/R, para 7.368.  
105
   Ibid., para. 372. 
106
  (2005) WT/DS267/AB/R, para 327. 
107
  2003 Horizontal Regulation, OJ 2003 L 270/1, Art.5. 
108
  Ibid., Annex IV. 
 27
Further difficulty may arise from the fact that Paragraph 6(d) requires that ‘the 
amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the factors of 
production employed in any year after the base period’.  It has, for instance, been argued that 
this criterion may be contravened by the obligation in the Community legal order to 'match' 
SFP payment entitlements to eligible land in order to unlock payments.109   
 Finally, it may be suggested that the SFP scheme has the effect of channelling 
production into certain crops and that, following the decisions of both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body in United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, this would exclude ‘green 
box’ compatibility.  In that dispute, receipts from production flexibility contracts under the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 and direct payments under the 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 were both held to be related to the type of 
production undertaken by the producer after the base period, and thus failed to conform with 
Paragraph 6(b).  Under both regimes producers were not required to grow any particular crop 
in order to receive payment; and under both regimes they could choose to grow nothing at all.  
In the case of production flexibility contracts, however, planting flexibility was constrained 
by a specific provision reducing or eliminating payments if, subject to exceptions, fruit and 
vegetables (other than lentils, mung beans and dry peas) were planted on upland cotton base 
areas.  The same constraints applied in the case of direct payments, subject to the important 
addition of wild rice to the list of crops covered by the planting flexibility limitations.  The 
Appellate Body, agreeing with the Panel, took the view that this ‘partial exclusion of some 
crops from payments has the potential to channel production towards the production of crops 
that remain eligible for payments.  In contrast to a total production ban, the channelling of 
production that may follow from a partial exclusion of some crops from payments will have 
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positive production effects as regards crops eligible for payments’.110  It therefore rendered 
the schemes in breach of URAA obligations. 
 With regard to the SFP, the chief threat to its ‘green box’ compatibility on these 
grounds is the provision that prevents farmers sustaining a claim for the SFP on land under, 
inter alia, fruit, vegetables and potatoes (except, in the case of potatoes, where they are 
intended for the manufacture of potato starch).111  As indicated, it could be contended that the 
effect is to channel support into sectors not subject to this exclusion.  It must be remembered, 
however, that where a Member State opts to allocate the SFP on a regional basis, the 
exclusion may not apply, with the result that ‘green box’ compatibility may be preserved.112 
 
 
C. Non-trade Concerns 
 
 
 
In the case of the SFP and other direct payments, the cross-compliance obligations imposed 
by the 2003 Horizontal Regulation do expressly address matters that could be regarded as 
‘non-trade concerns’.  Thus, the statutory management requirements set out in Annex III to 
the 2003 Horizontal Regulation are directed to: public, animal and plant health; 
environmental protection; and animal welfare.  Nevertheless, the generally applicable cross-
compliance obligations are arguably of insufficient rigour to justify 'green box' exemption 
under any paragraph of Annex 2 to the URAA.  By way of illustration, it would be difficult to 
classify those relating to the environment as ‘payments under environmental programmes’ 
within Paragraph 12 of Annex 2 to the URAA.  Not least, the eligibility criteria under 
Paragraph 12 include, inter alia, participation in a ‘clearly-defined government environmental 
or conservation programme’.  Accordingly, in the context of the WTO, it is perhaps not 
surprising that, rather than laying emphasis on cross-compliance, the Community has 
expressly predicated all claims to ‘green box’ compatibility for the SFP upon its 
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categorisation as ‘de-coupled income support’.  The more multifunctional elements of the 
SFP would appear rather to be highlighted internally, with a view to promoting public 
acceptance of the new support regime.  As affirmed by Commissioner Fischer Boel, ‘[c]ross 
compliance will do the additional job of making an explicit link between the environmental 
standards which the public expects and the support which the farmer receives’.113  
That said, it may be argued that set-aside payments qualify as ‘structural adjustment 
assistance’ provided through resource retirement programmes, under Paragraph 10 of Annex 
2 to the URAA.  Because, however, the ability for farmers to set aside land on a rotational 
basis has survived the Mid-term Review, these provisions are open to the objection that they 
constitute primarily a supply-side market management tool, as opposed to ‘structural 
adjustment assistance’ of the kind envisaged by the ‘green box’ criteria.  Indeed, the objective 
of controlling production was made explicit when set aside was first introduced by Council 
Regulation 1094/88.114  It should also be noted that the Mid-term Review requires farmers to 
maintain land set aside in good agricultural and environmental condition, ready to resume 
production should the need arise, a requirement that is of questionable compatibility with the 
concept of ‘structural adjustment assistance’.  
   Turning to the more targeted financial support provided under the Rural Development 
Regulation, the most important category of ‘green box’ exemption is arguably that covering 
‘payments under environmental programmes’.115  Under this category, as indicated, eligibility 
for payments must be determined as part of a clearly-defined government environmental or 
conservation programme.  It must also be dependent on the fulfilment of specific conditions, 
‘including conditions related to production methods or inputs’, while the amount of payments 
must ‘be limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying with the 
governmental programme’.  Although the broad intent of the exemption is clear, no definition 
is offered for a qualifying ‘environmental’ or ‘conservation’ programme.  This omission 
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could lead to disputes where, as is the case for several important Common Agricultural Policy 
initiatives, the aims and objectives of support schemes are mixed, with both an environmental 
and non-environmental component.  An example may be furnished by support for less-
favoured areas and areas with environmental restrictions, where there is both a focus on 
environmental protection and a parallel focus on social issues.  In WTO terms, there would 
seem to be no difficulty with the objective, as set out in the Rural Development Regulation, 
that support for less-favoured areas should ‘maintain and promote sustainable farming 
systems which in particular take account of environmental protection requirements’. But the 
Rural Development Regulation also permits payments in less-favoured areas ‘to ensure 
continued agricultural land use and thereby contribute to the maintenance of a viable rural 
community’; and this objective, more difficult to characterise as ‘environmental’, is given 
equal weight in the legislation.116   
In the context of payment schemes that are targeted at clearly environmental 
objectives, it may also be unclear to what extent the measures must be ‘targeted and deep’, as 
opposed to ‘broad and shallow’, in order to qualify for ‘green box’ exemption.117  A good 
illustration is provided by the recently introduced Environmental Stewardship Scheme in 
England.118  The land management options open to farmers include a less rigorous ‘entry 
level’ and a more rigorous ‘higher level’.119  ‘Green box’ compatibility will be less easy to 
articulate in the case of the former, where minimal changes in land use practices are required.  
Indeed, other environmental schemes based on the ‘broad and shallow’ model, such as Prime 
a l’Herbe in France, have been criticised as arrangements to provide disguised income 
support, with no genuine environmental component.120  A similar objection to ‘green box’ 
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compatibility could be also applied to the Environmentally Sensitive Areas programme in 
England.121  Like the Environmental Stewardship Scheme, there is more than one ‘tier’ of 
participation, including a basic ‘tier’ which offers payments for minimal changes in land use 
practice; and again there are both environmental and socio-economic objectives.  
Against this background, the EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, submitted to 
the WTO in 2000, accepted that the criteria for environmental schemes must be well targeted, 
transparent and implemented in a way which is not more than minimally trade-distorting;122 
but there was no attempt to address the substantive issue, namely, what is meant by 
‘environmental’ protection in the context of the farmed environment?  That said, it must be 
conceded that to determine the scope and objectives of agri-environmental schemes which 
will potentially qualify for ‘green box' exemption could prove complex, given the close inter-
relationship between farming and the environment.  As with maintaining land in good 
agricultural and environmental condition, many environmental concerns can only be met 
through continued farming, albeit using farming practices adapted to give a particular 
environmental benefit.  Examples would be the adoption of extensive grazing regimes aimed 
at re-creating moorland habitats or arable-cropping patterns targeted at protecting ground-
nesting birds.   
It is clear that the position adopted by the Community is based on the multifunctional 
premise that agri-environmental schemes produce joint products: agricultural produce and 
environmental services (i.e. public goods).  Indeed, the Community has already shown some 
sensitivity to the potentially trade-distorting effects of such schemes where they also allow 
continued farm production.  In a Discussion Paper on Agriculture’s Contribution to 
Environmentally and Culturally Related Non-trade Concerns, submitted to the WTO in 2000, 
the Community rejected the suggestion that agricultural produce generated by activities 
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funded under environmental schemes should be withdrawn from the market as wasteful and 
cost inefficient.  However, it accepted that the joint production of marketable products and 
environmental services should not be used to conceal distortive economic subsidies.123  The 
discussion paper put forward the proposal, therefore, that where society requires farmers to 
deliver public goods in pursuit of a ‘legitimate environmental or cultural objective’, then 
governments should only recompense farmers for their additional costs and income foregone, 
taking account of the income they derive from selling commodities on the market.   
This approach poses several questions, however. Which environmental objectives 
may be categorised as ‘legitimate’ for these purposes?   For example, is it proposed that 
‘green box’ exemption will cover both schemes promoting farmland biodiversity and schemes 
for the improvement of landscape values?  Additionally, the stated negotiating position of the 
Community ignores the fact that the Rural Development Regulation itself permits Member 
States to take account not only of income foregone and additional costs when devising 
payment regimes for agri-environmental schemes, but also the ‘need to provide an 
incentive’.124  Under the Community legal order for rural development, payments must be 
determined on the basis of objective criteria; and a ceiling does limit the incentive element to 
a maximum of 20 per cent of the income foregone and the additional cost of carrying out the 
commitments.125  The provision of incentive payments clearly has the potential to be trade-
distorting.  It may, therefore, be no coincidence that the recent proposal for a new Council 
Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development, which will replace the Rural Development Regulation, limits payments to 
additional costs and income foregone as a result of the commitment given, plus, where 
necessary, the option of covering transaction costs.126 
 As has been seen, since the Mid-term Review farmers may receive payment under the 
Rural Development Regulation for not just environmental but also animal welfare 
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commitments, provided that these involve more than the application of usual good farming 
practice, including good animal husbandry practice.127  A problem for the Community is that 
animal welfare payments do not yet feature within the categories of ‘green box’ support.  
Some comfort may nonetheless be provided by the fact that, when Chairman Harbinson 
issued in February 2003 his First Draft of Modalities for the Further Commitments, a 
suggested amendment to Annex 2 was the inclusion within Paragraph 12 of animal welfare 
payments as well as payments under environmental programmes; and this suggested 
amendment survived through to the revised document issued in March 2003.128  On the other 
hand, no specific mention was made of animal welfare in either the Doha Declaration or the 
2004 Framework Document.129  Likewise, it is not readily apparent that the payments in 
respect of 'meeting standards' and food quality, added to the Rural Development Regulation 
by the Mid-term Review, are compatible with current or proposed ‘green box’ criteria.  
Paragraph 2(f) of Annex 2 of the URAA refers to ‘marketing and promotion services, 
including market information, advice and promotion relating to particular products’.  
However, no measures granted green box exemption under Paragraph 2 may involve direct 
payments to producers or processors. 
 For the time being, the 2004 Framework Document commits WTO Members to the 
retention of the ‘green box’ in principle.  But it also identifies its review and clarification as a 
priority ‘with a view to ensuring that Green Box measures have no or at most minimal trade 
distorting effects or effects on production’.130  Similarly the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration saw agreement that the ‘green box’ criteria should be revisited, ‘inter alia, to 
ensure that programmes of developing country Members that cause not more than minimal 
trade-distortion are effectively covered’.131  There would seem to be agreement in principle 
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that non-trade concerns should be granted exemption from domestic support reduction 
commitments; but there would also seem to be recognition that the rules, as currently drafted, 
lack clarity and are arguably non-justiciable.132  The extent to which the ‘green box’ should be 
reviewed is already a matter of some dispute, with some Members seeking to widen or narrow 
its terms substantially, while other Members see the purpose of the exercise as rather the 
refinement and reform of the existing arrangements in order to give them greater clarity and 
efficacy.133  Any widening or narrowing of the ‘green box’ will be largely a matter for 
political discussion and agreement.  On the other hand, whether or not the 'green box' is 
widened or narrowed in scope, the refinement of its qualifying criteria to give them greater 
clarity and effectiveness is primarily a matter for legal discourse.  What can be said with some 
certainty is that if the URAA is to become an effective vehicle for the settlement of 
agricultural trade disputes, then its terms must be defined with much greater precision.  
 
D. Quantification 
  
An underlying principle of the URAA was to increase transparency.  A prime example of this 
principle in action, in the context of market access, was the conversion of most non-tariff 
barriers into tariffs capable of being bound and reduced.  By contrast, many of the 
problematic measures under discussion in the Doha Round are less susceptible to precise 
measurement. The Mid-term Review has emphasised the importance of the ‘green box’, 
which in turn highlights the need to establish a mechanism to determine the difficult question 
whether measures meet the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, 
trade-distorting effects or effects on production.  This raises the important issue of the 
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quantification of trade impacts, which will be examined here with regard to both decoupled 
income support and agri-environmental payments. 
In the case of decoupled income support, most economists agree that fixed payments tied 
to a variable, such as past production in a reference period, is not production-neutral.134  Both 
the SFP and the direct payments regime in the United States would in principle seem to fall 
within this category.  The payment performs an income substitution function, substituting a 
fixed income for a variable and uncertain profit.  This can have a variety of behavioural 
effects on the enterprise.  In the case of a farmer facing debt constraints, for example, the 
provision of a guaranteed and fixed annual income will facilitate forward financial planning 
and increase the range of available production decisions based on profit maximisation.  The 
application of sophisticated economic behavioural models has also demonstrated that an 
increase in production will be generated even in cases where no debt constraint is present.  
Not least, such direct payments reduce the degree of risk experienced by the farmer.135    
Significantly, in the only decision in which the Community has been held to be in 
violation of its commitments under the URAA, European Communities – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar, the Appellate Body displayed a willingness to place considerable weight on the 
economic effects of payment regimes under the Common Agricultural Policy rather than their 
strict legal form.136  The focus of European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar was 
not directly upon domestic support, but rather the alleged payment of export subsidies on 
sugar production in violation of commitments under Article 9.1 (c) of the URAA.  
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Nonetheless, several aspects of the decision have resonance with the issues which are being 
considered.  Under the common organisation of the market in sugar, growers of sugar beet 
received domestic support in the form of intervention, basic and minimum prices for sugar 
produced within their ‘A’ and ‘B’ quotas.  This domestic support secured prices which could 
be three times higher than those obtaining on the world market.  Sugar produced in excess of 
the A and B quotas (known as ‘C’ sugar) was not to be sold within the Community in the year 
in which it was produced. 137  The overall effect of these provisions was that export of C sugar 
over the period 1997-2002 amounted to between 1.3 and 3.3 million tonnes annually at prices 
that did not ‘even remotely’ cover the average total cost of production.138  
Two aspects of the ruling in European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar are 
important in the present context.  First, as indicated, it was held that the Community regime 
involved a ‘payment on the export of an agricultural product …financed by virtue of 
governmental action’ within the meaning of Article 9.1 (c) of the URAA.139  There was a 
‘tight nexus’ between the mechanism by which the payments were financed and 
governmental action.140   In the view of the Appellate Body, without the highly remunerative 
prices guaranteed for A and B beet, sales of C beet could not take place profitably at a price 
below the total cost of production.141  Secondly, there was a transfer of resources in that C 
sugar producers were able to use the profits made on the sale of  A and B sugar to cross-
subsidise the export of C sugar at prices lower than the cost of production.  Cross-
subsidisation in this manner constituted an export subsidy within the meaning of the 
URAA.142  In coming to this conclusion both the Panel and the Appellate Body used the 
average total cost of production as a benchmark to evaluate whether there was, in fact, a 
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‘payment’ in the sense of a real transfer of resources from A and B sugar production to C 
sugar production destined for export.143  
The Appellate Body’s reasoning emphasises the linkage between domestic support and 
export subsidies.  Its willingness to go behind the ‘formalistic’144 structures of the common 
organisation of the market, and to look instead at the economic realities of production and 
export costs, could also have major implications for any assessment of the potentially trade-
distorting effects of the SFP.  As noted above, it is generally accepted that the payment of 
direct income support is not production-neutral and that (at the very least) it supplies an 
income substitution function for agricultural producers.  In European Communities – Export 
Subsidies on Sugar, the Appellate Body was at pains to emphasise that its interpretation of the 
Community sugar regime did not erode the boundary between domestic support and export 
subsidies.145  In particular, there was an obligation to export C sugar with the result that the 
export was not an incidental effect of the domestic support system, but rather a direct 
consequence of the Community sugar regime.146  There may, indeed, be no obligation on 
producers to export in the case of the SFP.  Nevertheless, in terms of their economic effect, 
there are obvious, if not exact, analogies between domestic support in the case of the SFP and 
under the Community sugar regime that was found to infringe WTO disciplines in European 
Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar. 
Aside from any question of cross-subsidisation, the key issue in relation to the SFP and 
domestic support is not whether decoupled income support is trade-distorting (it is generally 
accepted that it is), but whether it is minimally so.  This raises the further issue as to how can 
its distorting effects be quantified.  In order to apply the fundamental requirement for ‘green 
box’ exemption correctly in this context would require a complex measurement of the 
economic effects of the support in question.  Yet the URAA gives no indication as to how this 
measurement is to be carried out, the criteria to be applied or the benchmarks against which it 
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is to be done.  It may also be ventured that, if the support is genuinely to target deficiencies in 
income, then the income of the producer (or lack thereof) should form a key criterion within 
any calculation of the level of support. This is demonstrably not the case with either the SFP 
or the direct payments regime in the United States.  However, it must also be recognised that 
any attempt for these purposes to determine the income of producers would be fraught with 
difficulty.  For example, to what extent would off-farm income be taken into account?  And to 
what extent would it be permissible to ‘average’ income to address major fluctuations in 
profitability?147 
Different considerations would seem to apply in the case of environmental payments.  In 
such circumstances, the proper application of Paragraph 12 of Annex 2 to the URAA would 
seem to require a measurement of the environmental externalities addressed by the support 
scheme in question (for example, reducing water pollution from agriculture) and the cost of 
implementing the scheme targeted at the problem.  If the cost of the corrective mechanisms 
outweighs the benefit from the change sought in the level of the adverse environmental 
externality, then in principle no action should be taken.148  Indeed, if the scheme in this case 
were to be implemented, any funds provided would be a disguised income support and 
potentially trade-distorting.  To prevent such abuse, new ‘green box’ criteria should arguably 
be developed.  Again, this may be no easy task in light of the range of mechanisms used to 
deliver support, such as tax incentives and management contracts.  For the same reason, some 
means should be found to ensure that support is targeted towards the factor generating the 
adverse environmental externality in question, and not simply towards the farming activities 
associated with it. 
Against this background, the importance of developing a more effective monitoring 
mechanism cannot be stressed too strongly. The 2004 Framework Document places particular 
emphasis on the need to develop enhanced monitoring and surveillance disciplines, but offers 
no guidance as to how this might be achieved.  It signals an intention to amend Article 18 of 
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  In the case of income tax, United Kingdom farmers have long been able to ‘average’: see now 
Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005, ss.221-225. 
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  See, e.g., J Rude, ‘Under the Green Box’, (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 1013. 
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the URAA, so as to improve monitoring and ensure full transparency by requiring timely and 
full notification by WTO Members in respect of domestic support, market access and export 
competition commitments.   Nonetheless, the lack of a detailed strategy in the case of the 
‘green box’ is evident from the fact that, in the only specific reference to the issue, it is simply 
stated that ‘the improved obligations for monitoring and surveillance of all new disciplines … 
will be particularly important with respect to the Green Box’. 149   
On a more positive note, considerable work on this problem has already been done 
outside the confines of the WTO.  In its 1998 Communiqué, the OECD Committee for 
Agriculture at Ministerial Level stressed the need to develop the appropriate analytical tools 
to monitor and evaluate developments in agricultural policies,150 and a series of initiatives has 
followed.  For example, the OECD report, Multifunctionality: a Framework for Policy 
Analysis, proposed work on the evaluation of non-market benefits;151 and another report, 
Market Effects of Crop Support Measures, addressed the key question of the trade 
consequences of domestic support.152  Parallel initiatives have also been undertaken by 
individual WTO Members.  For example, in 2000 the Community issued Indicators for the 
Integration of Environmental Concerns into the Common Agricultural Policy.153  It remains to 
be seen, however, whether a sufficiently transparent and robust system can be developed to 
inspire the confidence of the broader membership of the WTO.  Most importantly of all, it 
must be appreciated that improved monitoring will not, in itself, deliver an improvement in 
‘green box’ discipline. This can only be achieved if it is combined with the adoption of new 
criteria for the application of ‘green box’ exemption against which the effects of support can 
be measured more readily.  One approach might involve the establishment of baseline criteria 
against which the degree to which a measure is ‘distorting’ can be measured.  Another 
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approach might involve limiting the amounts of permissible annual support that can be 
delivered through decoupled income support, or placing a time limit on its application.154  
Imposing a cap on the amount of total 'green box' support is another strategy that would target 
this problem.  Indeed, such an approach has already been advocated by developing countries 
in the current WTO negotiations.155  Any movement in this direction would spell serious 
problems for the Community and would be strongly resisted; and one line of defence already 
explored has been to seek to divide the assault by differentiating between developing 
countries which are major exporters of agricultural commodities and developing countries 
which are in clear need of greater protection under any re-negotiated URAA.156  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The URAA has been roundly criticised for the obscurity of its drafting and for its 
unnecessary complexity.157  Before detailed measures for its successful reform can be agreed, 
a fundamental question must be addressed: what are the functions that a successful WTO 
agreement on agriculture should perform?  Attention has hitherto focused almost exclusively 
on the political agenda and the pressing need to establish a more equitable framework for 
agricultural trade.  Any re-negotiated agreement should also provide a framework of rules that 
are justiciable and sufficiently clear to form a basis for the resolution of disputes between 
Members.  And it must provide a sufficiently robust set of rules to prevent abuse, especially 
abuse of the 'green box' criteria for exemption from domestic support reduction commitments.  
A weakness of the current agreement is that the interpretation of several key legal provisions 
depends on the application of economic criteria to determine whether or not farm support is 
                                                 
154
  This is advocated by J Rude, ‘Under the Green Box’, (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 1013. 
155
  Agra-Europe Weekly, No.2071, 12 September 2003, EP/1-EP/2. 
156
  See, e.g., Commissioner Fischler, Speech/04/88, Restarting the Doha Round, Washington, DC, 19 
February 2004. 
157
  See, e.g. B. O’Connor, 'A Note on the Need for more Clarity in the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture', (2003) 37 Journal of World Trade 839. 
 41
trade-distorting (principally, in relation to the so-called ‘quantification’ issue in its different 
applications). 
Such obscurity may account for the fact that, despite the controversy surrounding 
farm support measures, the dispute resolution machinery established following the Uruguay 
Round has in the past been sparingly used in relation to the URAA.  However, the landscape 
has now been substantially reconfigured by United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton and 
European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar; and numerous support schemes and, 
indeed, the SFP itself looks more open to attack.  The decision in European Communities – 
Export Subsidies on Sugar has graphically illustrated not only the vulnerability of some 
Common Agricultural Policy regimes under WTO disciplines, but also the potential for the 
WTO dispute resolution machinery to drive significant internal change in the Community 
legal order.  Following the decision of the Appellate Body the common organisation of the 
market for sugar has been subjected to root and branch reform to reduce prices and switch 
domestic support under the umbrella of the SFP.158  At the same time, the 'green box' has 
assumed far greater significance in the Doha Round for the simple reason that it now contains 
a far greater volume of farm support payments.  This significance will be yet further enhanced 
if the re-negotiated agreement includes the provision in the 2004 Framework Document that 
'blue box' payments should be capped at 5 per cent of the total value of agricultural 
production during a reference period (yet to be agreed).159  The Community has already 
signalled a willingness to accept such a limitation.160 
It will be apparent from the above discussion that some facets of the SFP and 
schemes funded under the Rural Development Regulation make them vulnerable to the 
argument that they fall outside the 'green box'.  The stance adopted by the Community in the 
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negotiations presupposes the retention and revision of the 'green box'.  However, revising the 
‘green box’ criteria, so as to draw a clear line between measures that are trade-distorting (or at 
most minimally trade-distorting) and measures that are not, will prove extremely challenging.  
In this context, the 2004 Framework Document directs its focus on improved monitoring.161  
But monitoring will be of little use unless clear benchmarks and criteria are established 
against which measurable effects can be monitored.  Possible solutions might be to apply a 
fixed cap to the aggregate amount of 'green box' support that is permissible and/or to clarify 
the fundamental requirement.  A further solution might be to monitor, on an annual basis, the 
effect of support against published production criteria for a fixed base year.  More radical 
solutions of this type are gaining support among developing countries within the WTO;162 and 
this casts doubt on the ability of the Community to gain wider acceptance for the Mid-term 
Review and for its own vision of ‘green box’ reform to accommodate it. 
Indeed, there is growing evidence of a challenge from developing countries to the 
whole ethos of domestic support.  With the Mid-term Review, the Community may have re-
packaged its direct payment regime with the clear intent of securing 'green box' compatibility 
under the URAA as currently constituted; and the SFP does substantially track the detailed 
criteria for decoupled income support.  Yet, with direct payments accounting for 
approximately 30 billion Euros each year, the Community is faced with the compelling 
argument that, into whatever box such direct payments fall, the sheer volume of support 
cannot but influence production decisions and distort trade.163  It is ultimately this more 
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general argument that may yet present the greatest difficulty for the Community and for the 
prospects of securing a new Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
 
